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Abstract
This paper reports the first empirical investigation of the hypothesis that epistemic appraisals form
part of the structure of concepts. To date, studies of concepts have focused on the way concepts encode
properties of objects and the way those features are used in categorization and in other cognitive tasks.
Philosophical considerations show the importance of also considering how a thinker assesses the epis-
temic value of beliefs and other cognitive resources and, in particular, concepts. We demonstrate that
there are multiple, reliably judged, dimensions of epistemic appraisal of concepts. Four of these dimen-
sions are accounted for by a common underlying factor capturing how well people believe they under-
stand a concept. Further studies show how dimensions of concept appraisal relate to other aspects of
concepts. First, they relate directly to the hierarchical organization of concepts, reflecting the increase
in specificity from superordinate to basic and subordinate levels. Second, they predict inductive choices
in category-based induction. Our results suggest that epistemic appraisals of concepts form a psycho-
logically important yet previously overlooked aspect of the structure of concepts. These findings will
be important in understanding why individuals sometimes abandon and replace certain concepts; why
social groups do so, for example, during a “scientific revolution”; and how we can facilitate such
changes when we engage in deliberate “conceptual engineering” for epistemic, social, and political
purposes.
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1. Introduction
Most words in a person’s lexicon are associated in semantic memory with a meaning––with
a lexical concept. Concepts organize information in ways that guide communication, percep-
tion, and action. They are the fundamental basis of shared knowledge and culture. Much is
known about how concepts encode the features or properties that characterize a category. The
study of concepts should not, however, be limited to how categories are demarcated. Our aim
is to investigate the structure of concepts from an entirely different perspective: Is a given
concept epistemically useful? How much does a thinker know about the category? How well
does the category allow generalization? We want to find out whether people’s conceptual
knowledge includes appraisals of this kind––appraisals of the epistemic value of a concept.
Finding out how concepts are appraised is important because concept appraisals are likely
to play a key role in the way we change our concepts, both individually and collectively. The
history of science encompasses a series of “scientific revolutions” (Kuhn, 1970). During a
scientific revolution, as empirical findings accumulate that can no longer be accommodated
by existing theories, new concepts are constructed to replace the existing conceptual scheme.
For example, the concepts of heat and temperature were introduced to replace a concept that
was less useful, because it ran together these two different thermodynamic properties (Carey,
2009). While the existence of scientific revolutions has long been recognized, we still do not
know what kinds of epistemic appraisals drive scientists to abandon an existing concept and
replace it with something new.
Away from science, there has been growing interest in deliberately reconfiguring social
concepts in areas like race and gender (Haslanger, 2000). This process of “conceptual engi-
neering” is aimed at changing our concepts directly, so as to achieve improved public under-
standing and behavior (Cappelen, 2018; Machery, 2017; Thomasson, 2017). If the conceptual
engineering enterprise is to succeed, a psychological understanding of concept appraisal
will be critical. People will resist conceptual change when they feel that a concept is well-
understood, and when they have the sense that a given category supports generalizations and
forms a good basis for building knowledge. By contrast, undermining people’s epistemic con-
fidence in a concept, implicitly or explicitly, opens the way to its modification or replacement.
Since epistemic appraisal of concepts has not been investigated before, we turned to the
philosophical literature for suggestions about the kinds of appraisal to look for. The predomi-
nant focus in philosophy (in epistemology) has been the epistemic appraisal of beliefs and the
cognitive mechanisms for forming beliefs (Carr, 2017; Hookway, 1994; Skorupski, 2010). We
reflect on what we know, how much knowledge we have, and whether the things we believe
are accurate (Goldman & Beddor, 2015; Proust, 2013; Treanor, 2013). Similar assessments
can be applied to the set of information encoded in a concept. That is, we can reflect on our
own individual understanding of a concept. A concept is a cognitive tool, and in the first case,
the thinker may be asking, “how good am I with this tool, how well do I understand it?”
On the other hand, a thinker may focus on the tool itself and ask, “how useful is this tool?,”
“is it good for various purposes?” (Goldman, 1978), where the focus is not on the thinker’s
own understanding, but on the category itself. Some categories tell us a lot about an object
(Boyd, 1991; Keil, 1989; Quine, 1970). Category members share many features and display
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them reliably (Égré & O’Madagáin, 2019). The category is rich and homogeneous enough
that someone who has learned about it––whether the thinker herself, or some expert in the
relevant domain (Kalish, 2015; Putnam, 1973)––can usefully rely on it (Osherson, Smith,
Wilkie, López, & Shafir, 1990; Rips, 1975). When an object is correctly categorized under
the concept, we can form a large number of reliable expectations about that object (Millikan,
2000). Both of these broad kinds or families of epistemic appraisal––of the thinker’s own
understanding and of how useful the category is epistemically––potentially come in several
varieties, which we exploit in our studies. We draw these out in the next section (Section 1.1).
To develop a method to explore these questions, we took inspiration from a study by
Haslam, Rothschild, and Ernst (2000). They were interested in the different ways a social
concept could be based on an “essence.” To this end, they developed a set of nine scales,
which they considered to reflect different aspects of essentialism. Essentialized concepts were
hypothesized, among other things, to be natural, to support induction, and to be immutable.
Participants rated a set of 40 social categories on the nine scales.
Our method was to devise, in a similar fashion, a set of scales or “dimensions” (as we
will call them) to cover ways people may plausibly appraise their concepts epistemically. We
chose eight dimensions, as explained below. A first, basic question is whether or not these
dimensions of appraisal are readily evaluated for common concepts. That people reliably
agree on how to judge a set of concepts along a given dimension would lend credence to
the idea that epistemic appraisals are properties of these concepts. If the dimensions prove
reliable, then we go on to ask, still following Haslam et al. (2000), whether dimensions of
appraisal fall together into correlated clusters, or whether, evaluated across a broad selection
of concepts, people assess them independently.
A second broad question concerns the psychological importance of these forms of concept
appraisal. Are they an isolated island, nothing more than a stable pattern in the way people
answer various questions about concepts? Or are they integrated with other aspects of the
structure of concepts? We began to probe that question by examining whether the way a con-
cept is appraised predicts other aspects of conceptual knowledge. For this initial investigation,
we chose two well-studied phenomena: taxonomic structure (superordinate, subordinate, and
basic levels) and category-based induction.
1.1. Putative dimensions of appraisal
In this section, we explain how, guided by existing literature, we arrived at a set of dimen-
sions to form the basis of this initial exploratory study. Guided by the two broad kinds of
epistemic orientation mentioned above, we chose eight putative forms of appraisal, which we
call “dimensions” (and mark with Italics). A full description of these dimensions is given in
Table 1.
The first group of dimensions concern the thinker’s estimation of their own grasp or under-
standing of a concept. This is a matter of “epistemic self-audit” (Skorupski, 2010). Epis-
temologists have focused mainly on beliefs and knowledge, but some have also indicated
that the same principles should apply more widely: “concerning any element of our cogni-
tive apparatus, we can raise questions about its reliability” (Hookway, 1994, p. 214). Just
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Table 1
The eight dimensions used in Studies 1 and 2
Dimension Instructions Scale anchors
Accuracy For some categories of plant or animal, you may be
pretty sure that most of the things you believe about it
are true. For other categories, you might doubt some
of the beliefs you have about that category. Other
categories may lie in between.
sure they are true
to
not sure they are true
How Much Do
You Know
Some kinds of plants and animals will be well known to




Explain For some categories, you may feel confident that you
could explain what it is to someone who knew
nothing about the category. For other categories, you
may feel that you could not explain it very well to




Induction When you learn something new about some plants or
animals which belong in a category, others in the
category are likely to have the same new property. For
some categories, it may seem very likely that category
members will share a property. For other categories,
you would be very likely to dismiss this as a
coincidence. Other categories may fall in between
these extremes.
new property will apply
to
new property will not apply
Informativeness Some ways of describing plants and animals allow you
to infer many other things about it; knowing that some
plant or animal fits the description tells us a lot about
that plant or animal. Other ways of describing plants
or animals allow hardly any inferences about what
else they are like; knowing that some plant or animal
fits the description does not tell you much about it at




Deference For some categories, there are experts who could tell
you everything you need to know about plants and
animals in that category. For other categories, there
are no such experts and everyone is entitled to their
opinion. Other categories may lie in between.
defer to expert
to
do not defer to expert
How Much To
Learn
There is more to learn about some categories than
others. Starting from scratch, relatively how long do





Communicate Some categories are a good basis for communication;
people are likely to understand each other easily when
they talk about kinds of plant or animal using
category names. Other categories are less good for
communication; it is hard to predict what other people





Note: Instructions are shown for the Biology domain.
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as the reliability of beliefs consists in their truth or accuracy (Goldman & Beddor, 2015),
so too with concepts—we can assess how accurately they represent the world. A concept
encodes a collection of beliefs and expectations. Their accuracy is epistemically valuable
(Carr, 2017). Similarly, psychological studies of metacognition (mechanisms by which peo-
ple monitor and control their psychological states and processes) show that people are able to
keep track of accuracy in many domains, albeit only moderately well (Fleming, Weil, Nagy,
Dolan, & Rees, 2010; Koriat, 2015; Proust, 2013). So, our first dimension of appraisal, Accu-
racy, asks whether the information encoded by a given concept is accurate.
Avoiding error cannot be the only aim. We could do that by having no beliefs. Another
goal of cognition is to acquire truths (Goldman, 1978, 521), to extend our knowledge (Hook-
way, 1994, p. 211). Even if it is hard to quantify knowledge, people do make common-sense
judgments about how much they know (Treanor, 2013). In studies of metacognition, people
answer some questions by assessing how much information they are able to access (Koriat,
2012). Similarly, they can ask themselves how much they know about a category––that is,
how much information is encoded by their corresponding concept. So, our second putative
dimension of appraisal is How Much Do You Know.
Much of what we know is implicit rather than explicit (Davies, 2015). We cannot put it into
words. So, too, with concepts: They encode some information implicitly. For example, in a
categorization task, an object may be categorized based on its features, without the thinker
being able to identify which features are being used (Ashby & Valentin, 2017; Sloutsky,
2010). At the same time, they may still have some explicit metacognitive awareness of how
well they are likely to categorize new exemplars (Jacoby, Wahlheim, & Coane, 2010). A
similar distinction is made between two kinds of metacognition. “Procedural” metacognition
is often based on implicit information (e.g., Wahlheim, Finn, & Jacoby, 2012), for example, on
fluency of processing (Proust, 2012; 2013); “analytic” metacognition is often based on stored
explicit beliefs (“theory-based metacognition”: Koriat, 2007). Applied to concepts, we can
ask how much of what the thinker knows about a category is represented explicitly, and how
much is implicit. We operationalize that question by asking participants to tell us how well
they could explain the category to someone else. So, our dimension Explain is an appraisal of
how much of the information stored in a concept is explicit.
Next, we turn to our second group of dimensions. These are appraisals of how good a
concept is as a cognitive tool––of how epistemically useful the category is. Epistemologist
Alvin Goldman has argued that we can “assign appropriate values to different kinds of mental
representation” based on the goals they are used to obtain (Goldman, 1978, 522). Concepts
are used for the goal of forming reliable expectations about the properties of objects based
on what we have learned in the past (Millikan, 2000). A thinker sees an object, categorizes it
as a hazelnut, breaks it open and experiences its flavor, and stores that experience using their
HAZELNUT concept.1 Then, when next encountering an object that falls under HAZELNUT,
they can form an expectation about how it will taste. This ability to perform category-based
induction (Osherson et al., 1990; Rips, 1975) requires that a property observed in one member
of the category is likely to be shared by others, that its members are homogeneous in this
respect (Égré and O’Madagáin, 2019). Our Induction scale asks participants to rate different
concepts along this dimension.
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Usefulness for induction is not just a matter of how many members share a given feature,
but also of how many features are shared. If many features are shared across all or most
members of the category, categorizing an object under the concept tells you a lot about that
object. The most informative categories are natural kinds (Boyd, 1991; Millikan, 2000; Quine,
1970). We know that people treat natural kinds as having essences, which determine their
properties (Keil, 1989; Murphy & Medin, 1985). This essentialized way of thinking extends
to social concepts (Haslam et al., 2000), including those formed around a normative ideal
(e.g., the “true” scientist has a pure thirst for knowledge: Knobe, Prasada, & Newman, 2013).
Concept-users appreciate that some categories are more kind-like and informative than others.
Our Informativeness dimension asks participants to rate that directly.
Where there is a natural kind, there are often experts in that kind. The most epistemically
useful concepts are often supported by a high level of expertise. Ordinary concept users may
defer to experts about what members of the kind are like (Kalish, 2015) and rely on experts’
ability to classify real cases (e.g., to tell elms from beeches, Putnam, 1973). Conversely, peo-
ple’s disposition to defer to experts may indicate that they take a concept to be a particularly
epistemically useful one. Our Deference dimension asks participants to tell us directly about
deference to experts.
In the “guru effect,” thinkers take a piece of information communicated by a person pos-
sessing certain status (e.g., scientific, religious, and intellectual) to be based on deep ideas
that they do not grasp themselves (Sperber, 2010). More generally, when deferring to experts,
a person may feel there is a lot to learn about a category even though they do not know
much about it themselves. Our next dimension asks people how much they think there is to
learn about a category (How Much To Learn), starting from scratch. This is somewhat akin
to Informativeness, but it is more objective, since Informativeness depends upon your own
knowledge. You may think there is much to learn about amphibians, while not knowing much
yourself, so that learning that a creature is an amphibian does not tell you yourself much
about what it is like. Égré and O’Madagáin (2019) point out that some categories apply to
more members than others (“inclusiveness”). Having more members, as well as having more
features, might increase How Much To Learn. That would make superordinate categories rate
highly on this dimension (which we explore in the study of taxonomic structure, Study 3).
On the other hand, superordinate categories (like amphibian) are likely to have a diversity of
members, reducing the extent to which falling under the concept tells you much about what
an individual is like (i.e., potentially reducing Informativeness).
Finally, we come to a dimension, Communicate, which could exemplify either or both
of our two broad kinds of epistemic appraisal. Concepts are an interpersonal tool. They
are the basis on which we communicate with others and build a shared understanding.
Previous work has focused on the epistemic value of accuracy in communication. Even
young children keep track of the reliability of the people they communicate with (Koenig &
Harris, 2005), and adults continually exercise “epistemic vigilance” about the accuracy of the
things they are told (Sperber et al., 2010). Enlarging the focus slightly, it is plausible that
people have a sense of whether a concept builds on a shared understanding, whether they are
“on the same page” as those they are talking to. Most everyday concepts are a good basis
for communication (e.g., JOURNALIST, FROG), since people understand them in the same way
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(Murphy, 2002, 244). Other concepts are understood in different ways by different people
(PEST, WEED), including because some people have specialist knowledge that others do not
share (SCHIZOPHRENIA, ARTHROPOD). Our Communicate question asks participants to assess
concepts along this dimension. When expressing the concept, are people likely to understand
each other easily, or is it hard to predict what other people will have in mind?
The Communicate dimension falls within both of our broad families of concept appraisal.
On the one hand, it is an appraisal of a cognitive tool––assessing a concept as a potentially
shared cognitive resource. That would relate it to Informativeness and Induction, and poten-
tially also to How Much To Learn and Deference. On the other hand, people may be alive to
their own state of knowledge or ignorance about a category (what exactly is an arthropod?),
and thus appraise a concept’s suitability for communication based on whether they themselves
understand the category well. That would make Communicate analogous to rating how well
one could oneself categorize new exemplars under a concept (Jacoby et al., 2010), and would
put Communicate close to our other understanding-related dimensions: How Much Do You
Know, Accuracy, and Explain. So, the way Communicate relates in people’s minds to other
dimensions of appraisal, if at all, was an open question for our studies.
Our eight dimensions potentially overlap with one another in various other ways as well.
One aim of Studies 1 and 2 is to see whether they overlap in people’s minds: whether people
assess them independently (if indeed they are judged reliably at all), or whether some dimen-
sions are just notational variants of one another, different ways of asking about a common
underlying factor by which concepts are appraised.
1.2. The current experiments
The studies were designed to investigate the psychological reality of forms of concept
appraisal (Studies 1 and 2), and to probe their psychological importance (Studies 3–5). As an
initial study in a new field, the design was necessarily exploratory. At the outset, we did not
know whether there is any form of epistemic appraisal on which people would agree when
evaluating common concepts. Studies 1 and 2 investigate that. By selecting eight dimensions
widely across different potential forms of epistemic assessment, we hoped to discover reliable
forms of appraisal if they exist.
The second question for Studies 1 and 2 was whether there is duplication among our dimen-
sions: whether some dimensions are just different ways of asking about a common underlying
epistemic property. We explored that by asking for ratings for a wide range of common con-
cepts drawn from several different domains (social categories, health conditions, recreations,
plants and animals, artifacts, and foodstuffs). Study 1 used concepts selected to maximize
variability in our eight putative dimensions of appraisal, based on the experimenters’ intu-
itions. Study 2 performed the same procedure on a list of concepts drawn from existing con-
cept norms. All participants in a study rated the same concepts and each rated them on just one
of the eight dimensions. We looked at whether average ratings on any of the eight dimensions
would correlate between subjects across our broad sample of concepts. If several different
dimensions are appraised in the same way by different participants, that is evidence for a
common underlying factor. That in turn would suggest that it is this common factor, rather
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than a larger number of individual dimensions of appraisal, that is part of the underlying
structure of concepts.
Since Studies 1 and 2 provided preliminary evidence that different people do indeed reli-
ably judge the same concepts in the same way along various dimensions, we went on to
explore whether these appraisals are psychologically important––are they embedded in other
well-established aspects of the structure of concepts? Study 3 looked at whether dimensions
of appraisal predict taxonomic structure––the distinction between superordinate, subordinate,
and basic level concepts. Studies 4 and 5 examined the same question for category-based
induction, which we take to be one of the most important cognitive functions of a concept.
We investigated whether the concept appraisals established in Studies 1 and 2 would predict
the choices made by a different group of participants when given an induction task, the task
of extending features observed in some members of a category to a new instance.
2. Five studies
2.1. Study 1––Reliability and structure of dimensions of concept appraisal
Study 1 is the first step in establishing whether any forms of epistemic appraisal attach
to concepts. We investigated (a) whether people would agree in their appraisals of common
lexical concepts along our eight dimensions, and (b) whether people track many different
dimensions, or whether the different scales collapse into a smaller number of factors. Ratings
were obtained for 160 concepts, with each participant rating all concepts along just one of the
eight dimensions. With the aim of capturing whatever variability exists across the dimensions,
the experimenters used their own intuitions to generate a list of common concepts offering
contrasting assessments along one or more dimensions, for example in: How Much You Know
(DOG OWNER vs. LEGAL CLERK), Explain (STUDENT vs. CONNOISSEUR), Induction (GENIUS vs.
RENTER), or How Much To Learn (POLICE OFFICER vs. TEA DRINKER).
2.1.1. Method
2.1.1.1. Participants. There were 426 participants (295 females, 115 males, and 16
undeclared) recruited through Prolific Academic who participated in exchange for a small
monetary reward (Age 18–85; M = 35.6 years). Of these, 369 self-reported as native English
speakers, 43 as fluent non-native speakers, and 14 were undeclared. We excluded 27 par-
ticipants (6%) with extensive missing data on all four domains, leaving a final N of 399.
Participants were randomly allocated to one of eight groups, each judging a single dimension.
N within groups varied from 46 to 60.2
2.1.1.2. Materials design and procedure. Each participant rated 160 concepts on just
one of the eight dimensions. The concepts were 40 items from each of four domains, namely:
People (social categories); Recreations; Health; and (folk) Biology (plants and animals). The
eight dimensions and their corresponding low and high scale labels are shown in Table 1.
The definitions of the dimensions for Biology are shown. These were adapted for the other
domains. Included in the instructions were one putatively good and one poor example of the



























































































INFORM: Informaveness  
DEFER: Deference 
LEARN: How Much To Learn 
COMM: Communicate 
Fig. 1. Intersubject agreement in Studies 1–3. The graphs show reliability of dimensions as a function of the
amount of variance (SD) in the means for items. Lower variance reduces measured reliability.
dimension (not included in the subsequent question list). For example, in addition to the text
in Table 1, the instructions for Induction for the Biology domain continued:
If three sharks were found to have enzyme X, it may seem very likely that another shark
will also have enzyme X. For other categories, you would be very likely to dismiss this as a
coincidence. For example, if three weeds were found to have enzyme X, it may seem very
unlikely that another weed will also have enzyme X. Other categories may fall in between
these extremes.
Participants were told that if they had no idea what a word meant, they should leave that
question blank. The participant was given as much time as they needed to understand the
instruction for their assigned dimension. They were then asked to rate 160 concepts on that
dimension. All scales ran from 1 to 5, anchored at the extremes with the scale anchors shown
in Table 1. The four category domains were presented in a different random order for each
participant and the 40 items for each category domain were presented randomly ordered on
two pages. All words, with their mean ratings, are listed in the Supplementary Materials
(Appendix A). Participants completed the questionnaire online, programmed in Qualtrics.
2.1.2. Results
2.1.2.1. Intersubjective agreement. Our first question was whether, for a given dimen-
sion, different people would appraise a wide range of concepts in the same way. To measure
the degree of consensus, we calculated Cronbach’s α, a measure of reliability with a maxi-
mum of 1. Fig. 1 shows the reliabilities for the dimensions. Alpha was greater than .86 for
all eight dimensions, indicating very high levels of consensus and good reliability, given the
10 of 35 S. R. Thorne et al. / Cognitive Science 45 (2021)
Table 2
Correlations (r) between dimensions, across 160 concepts for Study 1
Accuracy
How Much





3 Explain .79** .82**
4 Communicate .68** .64** .79**
5 Induction –.14 –.28** –.27** –.10
6 Informative –.17 –.36** –.22* –.03 .76**
7 Deference –.26** –.44** –.34** –.15 .64** .59**
8 How Much To
Learn
–.21* –.31** –.18 –.10 .40** .59** .67**
KEY
> .8 > .6 > .4 > .2 0 < –.2 < –.4 < –.6 < –.8
Note:
*p < .01.
**p < .001. (Bonferroni corrected p values, |r| > .4, p < .000001, |r| > .3, p < .005, |r| > .25, p < .05.)
relatively small sample sizes. Means for each item within each domain were calculated for
each of the eight dimensions, using all nonmissing data (2.4% of responses were missing3).
Fig. 1 shows how reliability varied as a function of the spread of means (SD) within the list.
Where variance in means of the sample of items is low, one can expect measured reliability
to be an underestimate. This effect can be seen for Accuracy and Induction in Study 1.
2.1.2.2. Factor structure analysis. Having established that all of our eight dimensions
show strong between-subject agreement across concepts, our second question related to
whether people keep track of eight separate dimensions of appraisal, or whether the dimen-
sions collapse into a smaller number of factors. This analysis was based on the mean scale val-
ues for each of the 160 concepts on each of the eight dimensions. First, correlations between
the dimensions across the 160 category items were calculated (Table 2). High positive corre-
lations were seen between the first four dimensions, and between the last four dimensions in
the table, indicating the probable existence of two underlying factors at this level of analysis.4
(The order of dimensions has been changed from that in Table 1 to show the clustering into
the two components. All further tables now adopt this order.)
A principal component analysis (PCA) was performed with the aim of explaining variance
of the eight dimensions across concepts in terms of variation in a smaller number of under-
lying components (each component being a weighted sum of the dimensions). PCA reduced
the eight dimensions to just two underlying uncorrelated components, capturing 77% of the
variance. Once two components had been “extracted,” they were then “rotated” with Vari-
max rotation (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). The aim of rotation is to allocate each of the
eight dimensions clearly to just one component, thus simplifying the interpretation of the























Principal Components: Study 1, All Domains
Fig. 2. Component loadings for the eight dimensions in Study 1, across all domains of concepts.
analysis without loss of information. Each component is a weighted sum of the eight dimen-
sions. The weight or “loading” of a dimension on a component, Component 1 say, indicates
how much of the variance in people’s ratings along that dimension can be explained by vari-
ation in Component 1. These loading patterns are shown in Fig. 2.5
As seen in Fig. 2, variation in the eight dimensions of appraisal could be explained by varia-
tion in two underlying components, each combining four of the eight dimensions. Component
1 combines the dimensions C ommunicate, A ccuracy, How Much You K now, and E xplain.
In order to separate the operational measures from the psychological construct, we use the
shorthand “CAKE” for the four dimensions and, for reasons explained below, the term “sense
of understanding” or “SoUnd” for the psychological construct (Component 1). Component 2
combines the dimensions How Much To L earn, I nduction, D eference, and I nformativeness.
“LIDI” is shorthand for these four dimensions. Since these dimensions do not cluster consis-
tently in our subsequent experiments, we do not introduce a term for a psychological variable
corresponding to Component 2.6
To probe whether these two components represent a general underlying structure, we exam-
ined whether this two-component structure is maintained within each conceptual domain. A
separate PCA was performed for each of the four domains. If there are indeed just two under-
lying forms of appraisal, then the eight dimensions should continue to cluster into two com-
ponents within each domain. Alternatively, given the very different kinds of concept found
in social, health, or biological domains (Dahlgren, 1985), differences in how appraisals are
structured may appear. It should also be noted that when considering individual domains, our
data are at the limit of the recommended minimum ratio of cases to variables for PCA (5:1).

































































































Biology Components 1 vs 3 Key:  
ACC: Accuracy 




INFORM: Informaveness  
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Fig. 3. Principal component plots for the four domains in Study 1. The gray ovals show the four dimensions of
Sense of Understanding (SoUnd), consistently loading on Component 1.
Fig. 3 shows the component structure that emerged from the four within-domain PCAs.
People, Recreations, and Health showed a clear two-component structure, whereas the Biol-
ogy domain produced a three-component structure. In all four domains, the four CAKE
dimensions (Communicate, Accuracy, How Much Do You Know, Explain) formed a clear
component. This suggests that there is a single factor (SoUnd) underlying assessments along
these four dimensions. To give a sense of the significance of this factor, Fig. 4 shows how the
40 social categories (the People domain) are distributed with respect to it.
By contrast, the structure of the other four dimensions (LIDI) varied across domains. This
variability suggests that there is no corresponding single factor underlying appraisals of How
Much To Learn, Induction, Deference, and Informativeness. Although reliably rated, they
come out as independent dimensions of epistemic appraisal.
2.1.3. Discussion
Study 1 was exploratory. Nevertheless, based on the philosophical literature, we expected
that some or all of our dimensions would be reliably rated between subjects. We found that in
fact all eight were. For each dimension, different people make similar judgments about how
a range of concepts score on that dimension.
We went on to ask whether judgments about some of the different dimensions were driven
by a single underlying factor. We uncovered evidence that a single factor captures four of
























































Component 1 – SoUnd factor
Social Categories
Fig. 4. Plot of concepts in the People domain, showing distribution in the Sense of Understanding (SoUnd) factor
discovered in Study 1.
the dimensions (Communicate, Accuracy, How Much Do You Know, and Explain––CAKE),
implying that a common intuition underlies these different judgments. This factor explained
variance on these dimensions even within each conceptual domain. The other four dimensions
did not relate to an underlying factor. How Much To Learn, Deference, Induction, and Infor-
mativeness (LIDI) clustered differently in different domains, evidence that, although partici-
pants agree on how concepts should be scored on each of these dimensions, these appraisals
vary independently.
The dimensions Accuracy, How Much Do You Know, and Explain were drawn from our first
broad family of epistemic appraisals, those concerned with the thinker’s own understanding of
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a concept. The underlying factor we discovered (underlying the CAKE dimensions) includes
a fourth dimension, Communicate, which we had thought could be in either broad family:
connected to self-understanding, or alternatively a matter of assessing the value of a con-
cept as a cognitive tool. Study 1 suggests it is the former. The psychological variable which
underlies judgments about these four dimensions is a form of self-understanding or epistemic
self-audit, so we label this factor “sense of understanding” or “SoUnd.” Study 1 provides
preliminary evidence that SoUnd is a property of concepts.
2.2. Study 2: Replication with a standard sample of concepts
Study 2 replicated the procedure and analysis of Study 1 with a new set of concepts. In
Study 1, we deliberately selected concepts which we believed would vary on our eight dimen-
sions. A question remains as to what will emerge using a naturalistic sample of concepts. Will
the dimensions still be reliable, and will the SoUnd factor still emerge consistently? Study
2 took concepts from taxonomic category norms used in previous research, expanding the
domains to foodstuffs and artifacts.
2.2.1. Method
2.2.1.1. Participants. Using Prolific Academic, 419 participants were recruited (309
females, 99 males, and 11 unspecified) for a small monetary reward (Age 17–73; MAge =
35.8). Of these, 342 were native speakers, and the remainder fluent or competent in English.
Fifteen participants failed to complete the questionnaire, leaving a final N of 404.
2.2.1.2. Materials, design, and procedure. Participants completed the same question-
naire as in Study 1 with a new list of concepts. They were randomly allocated to one of eight
groups, each group rating 160 items on just one of the dimensions of appraisal, as before.
Concepts were drawn from social (Sports), biological (Fruit and Vegetables in a combined
list), and two different artifact domains (Clothing and Furniture). In each domain, 40 con-
cepts were selected at random from a standard list of taxonomic categories, Hampton and
Gardiner (1983) (see Supplementary Materials, Appendix B).
2.2.2. Results
2.2.2.1. Intersubjective agreement. As with Study 1, we first investigated which dimen-
sions were rated reliably between subjects. Did different participants applying a given dimen-
sion rate the 160 concepts in a similar way on the five-point scale provided?
As in Study 1, to assess reliability of the scales across the full set of 160 categories, it was
necessary for participants to have a complete set of responses. Missing data were handled as
follows. Thirty-nine participants (9%) with 5 or more (out of 40) missing data points on any
single domain were excluded from the reliability analysis. Where there were fewer than five
missing responses, the missing responses were replaced with the mean. Fig. 1 shows reliabil-
ity (Cronbach’s α) for the eight dimensions. In addition, the standard deviation for category
means is shown, since low variance across the means will contribute to lower measured reli-
ability. Alpha was above .9 for six of the dimensions. Induction (.820) and Informativeness
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Principal Components: Study 2, All Domains
Fig. 5. PCA loading plot for Study 2, all domains together with means superimposed.
(.738) had lower values, attributable to low variance (SD of 0.3 or lower, see Fig. 1). Given
that the categories were not sampled with the aim of generating variability on the dimensions
(unlike in Study 1), the low variance for some dimensions is not unexpected.
2.2.2.2. Factor structure analysis. For each dimension, the mean rating for each of the
160 concepts was calculated. Correlations between the dimensions were calculated, and the
four dimensions of SoUnd seen in Study 1 again correlated strongly (CAKE). The remaining
four dimensions (LIDI) showed no clear pattern of correlation.
The mean ratings for most dimensions showed substantial differences between domains
(Sport, Fruit and Vegetables, Clothing, Furniture).7 To focus just on within-domain correla-
tions, dimension scores were transformed into z-scores so that each domain had a mean of
0 and SD of 1 on each dimension. The data were then submitted to PCA. Two components
captured 74% of the variance. Fig. 5 shows the way the eight dimensions load onto these com-
ponents. Component 1 is a cluster of the four SoUnd dimensions. Component 2 is represented
by Deference and How Much To Learn. As described above, Informativeness and Induction
suffered from low reliability and low variance within domains and so were less well corre-
lated with either component. Where a domain lacks variation on a dimension, there is limited
scope to measure correlations of that dimension with others.
As in Study 1, we performed a PCA with Varimax rotation within each domain. All four
domains produced a two-component solution, as shown in Fig. 6. Where reliability for a
dimension dropped below .75, the label has been grayed out, to indicate that its position on
the graph is unreliable. Component 1 captures the variance in the four SoUnd dimensions
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Fig. 6. Loading plots for PCA within domains for Study 2. Note: Grayed out dimensions had lower reliability
(alpha < .75). Oval shaded areas contain the SoUnd dimensions.
(Communicate, Accuracy, How Much Do You Know, and Explain) in all four domains. Defer-
ence and How Much To Learn came out as strongly loaded on Component 2 in all domains.
There was no clear cross-domain pattern for Induction and Inference, which in any event
showed low reliability. Although Deference and How Much To Learn clustered together in
the domains covered in Study 2, Study 1 found them to vary independently across other con-
ceptual domains, suggesting they have no underlying common factor.
2.2.3. Discussion
Replication with a naturalistic sample of concepts showed the same broad pattern seen in
Study 1. For each of the four CAKE dimensions, ratings showed intersubjective agreement.
Ratings correlated across these dimensions and could be accounted for by a single underlying
common factor, SoUnd.
Deference and How Much To Learn were also reliably rated between subjects for the 160
concepts used in Study 2. Induction and Informativeness were not, but that finding is hard to
interpret since the domains of concepts we used generated little variation in judgments along
these two dimensions.
Taken together, Studies 1 and 2 delivered the first evidence that some of the forms of
epistemic appraisal of concepts that were suggested to us by the philosophical literature are
indeed psychologically real: a factor SoUnd, a varying sense of how well thinkers understand
different concepts, which drives judgments along the dimensions Communicate, Accuracy,
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How Much Do You Know, and Explain; separate, independent appraisals of the dimensions
Deference and How Much To Learn; and also some evidence of independent appraisal of
Induction and Informativeness (in Study 1).
2.3. Study 3: Taxonomic levels
Having discovered some forms of reliable concept appraisal, we next investigated whether
these forms of appraisal are integrated with other aspects of the structure of concepts. In Study
3, we did that in relation to taxonomic structure.
Many concepts are organized hierarchically, for example, MAMMAL-DOG-SPANIEL. There
is considerable evidence that a representation of taxonomic level is part of the structure of
concepts. In particular, the intermediate or “basic level” (e.g., DOG) has been found to be
psychologically important. It acts as a preferred level for categorization and other tasks.
Basic level categories show more within-category similarity than superordinate level con-
cepts, while retaining considerable between-category dissimilarity, unlike subordinate level
concepts (Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, & Boyes-Braem, 1976). The basic level has been
identified as the highest level at which category members are easily imageable and share the
same parts (Corter & Gluck, 1992; Tversky & Hemenway, 1984).
We predicted that, if the forms of appraisal we had discovered were part of the structure of
concepts, then they would predict aspects of taxonomic structure. Our method was to obtain
ratings on the eight dimensions of appraisal for a new set of concepts, concepts selected in
hierarchically organized triples: superordinate-basic-superordinate. We expected that basic
level concepts, being the preferred cognitive tool for many concept-involving tasks, would
carry the highest sense of understanding. So, we predicted that a high rating on the SoUnd
factor (a weighted sum of the four CAKE dimensions) would correlate with a concept’s being
found at the middle level in these triplets, the basic level.
By contrast, as categories become increasingly specific, learning that an item belongs to
the category continues to become more and more informative, and inductions about the cate-
gory become increasingly reliable. A classic study by López, Atran, Coley, Medin, and Smith
(1997) showed that U.S. students find induction based on folk-generic categories like ROBIN
to be stronger than that based on the basic level categories identified by Rosch et al. (1976),
for example, BIRD, which are at a higher taxonomic level. Accordingly, we predicted that
Induction and Informativeness would increase when moving down through the hierarchy from
superordinate to basic and subordinate level concepts. We had no firm predictions about How
Much To Learn and Deference although, as noted in the introduction, if people think that hav-
ing more members (being more “inclusive,” Égré & O’Madagáin, 2019) implies that there is
more to learn about a category, then How Much To Learn would decrease down the hierarchy,
as more specific categories have fewer members.
2.3.1. Method
2.3.1.1. Participants. Participants were 341 adults (235 females, 105 males, and 1
unspecified), recruited through Prolific Academic for a small monetary reward (Age 18–72;
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MAge = 35.2). Of these, 293 participants were native speakers of English, and the remainder
self-rated as fluent or competent. Nine participants failed to complete, leaving a final sample
of 332.
2.3.1.2. Materials, design, and procedure. The first step was to generate 53 suitable con-
cept triplets, so as to give us 159 concepts to use in the dimension-rating task.8 Initially, the
five authors together came up with 65 hierarchically organized triplets (e.g., MAMMAL-DOG-
SPANIEL), with no overlaps. Pretesting was performed to select triplets that were suitable in
terms of familiarity and hierarchical organization. All words in a triplet had to be highly
familiar (mean 4.5 or more on a 1–5 scale). Imageability ratings had to confirm that the mid-
dle term was indeed at the basic level: It was required to have an imageability rating of at least
4 out of 5, and to be at least as imageable as the two other terms. We also asked participants
to judge whether each lower-level category did indeed belong in the class above, requiring
that each class inclusion relation was confirmed by at least 95% of participants. Details of
pretesting are in the Supplementary Materials (Appendix C).
A new set of participants were then allocated at random to one of eight groups, each group
rating all 159 concepts, presented in a random order, on one of the eight dimensions. Partici-
pants completed the questionnaire online through Qualtrics.
2.3.2. Results
2.3.2.1. Intersubjective agreement. The data were scanned for missing values. Thirteen
participants (4%) with missing data were excluded from further analyses. The final number of
participants for each level for each dimension ranged between 37 and 42. All dimensions had
reliability (α) greater than 0.85. Values are shown in Fig. 1, together with SD for the category
means. Thus, with this new set of concepts, we replicated the first result of Studies 1 and 2:
that people reliably judge concepts along these dimensions in the same way.
2.3.2.2. Differences between hierarchical levels. For each dimension, the mean rating of
the 53 items at each of the three levels was calculated (Fig. 7). The means were submitted to
a mixed 8×3 ANOVA with Dimension between-subjects with eight levels, and Level within-
subjects with three levels. There were significant effects of both Dimension (F (7, 324) =
29.3, p < .001, ηp2 = .39), and Level (F (2, 648) = 61.2, p < .001, ηp2 = .16), and a significant
interaction (F (14, 648) = 49.4, p < .001, ηp2 = .52). The effects were as strong when treating
items as a random effect (ηp2 = .56, .59, and .44, respectively). There was, therefore, strong
evidence that the dimensional means varied across levels, and in different ways. A breakdown
analysis considered the Level factor for each dimension individually. All effects of Level were
significant at p < .001, with the exception of a weaker effect for Induction (p = .01), and zero
effect for Deference (F < 1). (With Bonferroni correction for eight comparisons, α = .006,
and Induction fails to reach significance.)
All four SoUnd dimensions showed the predicted pattern of higher ratings for the basic
level, thus further validating the SoUnd factor constructed out of these four dimensions. Basic
level concepts also tend to be more familiar, and although we only chose concepts with high
familiarity, there was still some variation within the set of items. Entering familiarity as a














Fig. 7. Mean ratings for each dimension as a function of level for Study 3. Error bars show 95% CI. The four
dimensions to the left relate to Sense of Understanding and show a consistent basic level advantage.
covariate in the ANOVA showed it to be a significant predictor of ratings for all four dimen-
sions. However, three of the dimensions (Communicate, Accuracy, and Explain) still showed
strong significant effects of level when controlling for familiarity.
For the dimensions of Induction and Informativeness, there was, as predicted, a linear
increase from superordinate through basic to subordinate levels. As the category became more
specific, so within-category similarity increased, and with it the perceived inductive potential
and informativeness of the category. The effect, however, was much stronger for Informative-
ness (ηp2 = .87) than for Induction (ηp2 = .09). A trend in the reverse direction was seen
for How Much To Learn. People think there is more to learn about a category if it has more
members. Interestingly, for Deference, the means were all equal and close to the midpoint of
the scale.
2.3.3. Discussion
The dimensions of Communicate, Accuracy, How Much Do You Know, and Explain all
showed the highest ratings for basic level concepts. Studies 1 and 2 provided evidence that
judgments on these dimensions are driven by a common underlying factor, a sense of how
well the thinker understands a given concept (SoUnd). The fact that they behave the same
way in relation to taxonomic structure is further evidence that the four CAKE dimensions
are driven by a common factor. Study 3 provides evidence that SoUnd is integrated with a
much-studied aspect of conceptual structure, namely, taxonomic organization, and thus that it
forms part of the structure of concepts.9 The highest SoUnd attaches to basic level concepts,
20 of 35 S. R. Thorne et al. / Cognitive Science 45 (2021)
people’s preferred way of categorizing the world (Rosch, 1977). Post hoc analysis confirmed
that the effect was not driven solely by differences in familiarity.
In keeping with the earlier studies, we found that the dimensions How Much To Learn,
Induction, Deference, and Informativeness (LIDI) worked in different ways. We predicted
that subordinate categories would be rated as higher on the Induction and Informativeness
dimensions. The higher within-category similarity found at the subordinate level should make
a concept a better basis for induction. Further differentiation from the basic level should make
the concept more informative. This prediction was borne out. On the other hand, superordinate
categories were rated more highly on How Much To Learn. This result would make sense if
people envisage a wider diversity of members to learn about. We observed no variation in
Deference across levels.
2.4. Study 4: Induction with single categories
Studies 4 and 5 continue to explore the hypothesis that concept appraisal forms part of the
structure of concepts. Taking the dimensions of concept appraisal validated in the first three
studies, we now ask whether they are integrated with another central feature of concepts,
namely, their role in category-based induction.
As noted in the introduction, a category provides a better basis for induction if members of
the category reliably share many properties (Égré & O’Madagáin, 2019; Millikan, 2000). Pre-
vious studies have shown that beliefs about within-category similarity (category coherence)
correlate with judgments in inductive reasoning tasks (Patalano, Chin-Parker, & Ross, 2006;
Patalano, Wengrovitz, & Sharpes, 2009) and are related to the entitativity scale in the Haslam
et al. (2000) study of essentialism. Based on this research, we predicted that there would be
dimensions of concept appraisal that predict people’s inductive judgments. Our dimensions
of Induction and Informativeness ask explicitly about two aspects of category coherence––
how reliably are properties shared between members, and how many properties are shared?
The study was exploratory with respect to the other dimensions of appraisal, although we
expected that concepts about which people have a high sense of understanding, as measured
by the SoUnd construct, might have an inductive advantage, as might those about which peo-
ple showed Deference, being more kind-like or scientific; similarly for high ratings in How
Much To Learn.
In this initial study, we did not aim to establish whether dimensions of concept appraisal
can act as better predictors of inductive judgments than other measures. We simply wanted
to investigate how, if at all, concept appraisals are integrated with the inductive structure of
concepts. The method employed was correlational. The dependent variable was the judgment
that a novel property, found in three exemplars of a category, was likely to be found in another
randomly selected category member. Using partial correlation, we aimed to identify whether
the dimensional ratings collected in Study 1 would predict inductive judgments. Since class
size could have an effect on inductive judgments (Nelson & Miller, 1995), we also collected
ratings of frequency for each category, so as to ensure that beliefs about the size of a category
were not a cofounding factor in the results.
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2.4.1. Method
2.4.1.1. Participants. One hundred and twenty-five participants (85 females, 38 males,
and 2 unspecified) were recruited (Age 18–68; MAge = 34.44). Of these, 103 participants were
native speakers, and the remainder were fluent or competent in English. Two participants were
excluded for failing to complete the study.10
2.4.1.2. Materials, design, and procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to one
of three groups each completing 28 induction problems in one of three domains: People (N =
42), Recreations (N = 41), and Health (N = 40). All problems followed an identical structure.
The premise stated that three members of a category (e.g., “police officers,” “people who
swim”) were found to have a particular characteristic (e.g., personality type X, or an increase
in levels of X). Participants were then asked to indicate the probability of another member of
the category showing the same characteristic on a sliding scale of 0 (“no more than chance”)
to 100 (“a lot above chance”). The following is an example from the People domain:
A psychologist studying personality has noticed that people belong to one of two differ-
ent personality types: Personality type X and personality type Y. In her study, she noticed
that three people who were LIBRARY USERS had personality type X. How likely is it that
the next LIBRARY USER she tests will also have personality type X?
Using the means from Study 1, we selected categories to maximize differences along the
eight dimensions across the 28 problems in each domain, while avoiding strong correlations
between the cluster of four SoUnd dimensions and the other four. To this end, pairs of cate-
gories were selected to be maximally contrasted on either the SoUnd factor (a weighted sum
of the CAKE dimensions), or on the sum of the other four dimensions (LIDI).11
We selected 16 pairs of categories in each of the three domains, eight matched on one set
of dimensions and differing maximally on the other, and eight with the reverse contrast. Cat-
egories were selected in matched pairs as we needed materials in this form for use in Study
5, where categories were pitted against each other directly. Because of some overlap between
pairs, additional concepts were randomly selected to bring the total number of concepts in
each domain to 28. All the induction problems and concepts used are provided in the Supple-
mentary Materials (Appendix D).
Each domain used two scenarios, each with 14 categories to judge. Participants were
instructed that there was no right or wrong answer. The scenarios were presented in a fixed
order, and the order of categories was counterbalanced. Upon completion, participants were
able to provide comments on how they made their judgments. Finally, participants judged
how many people were in each category in the context of the problem scenario, using a Likert
scale of 1 (very few) to 5 (very many).
2.4.2. Results
2.4.2.1. Exclusions and transformation. Participants with 3 or more of the 28 induc-
tion responses missing (N = 2) or who gave the same rating to all questions (N = 7) were
excluded,12 leaving a final sample of 114. Otherwise, missing data were replaced with the
participant mean. Similar exclusion criteria were applied to the class size questions, leaving a
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sample of 108 (of 125) for the measure. Reliability checks on the dependent variable showed
alpha between .43 and .81 across domains. Mean inductive responses were calculated for each
category on the scale from 0 to 100. Within domains, mean and (SD) were as follows: People,
M = 36% (6%), Health, M = 46% (8%), and Recreations, M = 57% (3%). Distributions did
not deviate from normal.
2.4.2.2. Induction responses. The starting point was the concept appraisals collected
in Study 1: the mean rating of each concept on each dimension. To see whether these
appraisals predicted inductive judgments, correlations were first calculated within each of
the domains between the inductive response and each of the eight dimensions, and then
averaged over domains. The four dimensions comprising the SoUnd factor all had mean
correlations close to zero (< 0.1), showing no relation between people’s average ratings on
these dimensions (CAKE) and inductive judgments. The four remaining dimensions all had
positive correlations, with Deference not statistically significant (r = .311, p = .11), but
Induction, Informativeness, and How Much To Learn all significantly above zero (r = .489,
.482, and .483, p < .001).
Analyzing the data across all 84 problems, two controls were introduced. First, we con-
trolled for the strong differences between mean inductive responses across domains. Second,
given that the Induction question in Study 1 is closely related to the question about induction
asked in this study, we chose to hold the Induction dimension constant to discover whether
the other seven dimensions were playing an additional role in the judgments in this study.
Partial correlations were calculated between the inductive response and each of the seven
dimensions, holding constant Induction, and with dummy-coded binary variables to equate
domain differences. Results are shown in Fig. 8.
Figure 8 reveals that two dimensions predicted how much people felt that a novel prop-
erty would also be found in other category members, over and above the Induction ratings
in Study 1. These were Informativeness and How Much To Learn. None of the four dimen-
sions comprising the SoUnd factor played a significant role in the judgment. We can con-
clude that the Informativeness and How Much To Learn dimensions of appraisal, in addition
to Induction, are integrated with the aspects of conceptual structure that drive the way con-
cepts are relied on as a tool for induction. Class size was also examined as a possible predic-
tor of inductive judgments, but had no significant effect (partial correlation holding domain
constant = –.006, p >.05).
2.4.3. Discussion
The results further supported the hypothesis that the dimensions of stable concept appraisal
examined in Studies 1 and 2 are integrated with the structure of concepts. In addition to
Induction, the way a concept is rated for Informativeness and How Much To Learn was found
to predict the extent to which the corresponding category would be relied on for inductive
inference. Category-based induction is one of the most important ways concepts are used as
a cognitive tool (Millikan, 2000). Study 4 shows that appraisals of Informativeness and How
Much To Learn are part of, or closely related to, those aspects of conceptual structure that are
relied on in performing inductive inference.
















Paral Correlaon with Seven Dimensions of Appraisal
Fig. 8. Partial correlations of seven dimensions with the induction judgments provided in Study 4, holding constant
domain differences and the Induction dimension. The dotted line shows the critical value of r for .05 significance
with Bonferroni correction (r(79) = .31).
2.5. Study 5: Induction with two competing categories
In this final study, we sought to probe more deeply into the relationship between concept
appraisal and inductive judgments. Using a procedure from Patalano et al. (2006; see also
Nelson & Miller, 1995), we examined whether dimensions of concept appraisal predict peo-
ple’s inductive judgments when two concepts are pitted against one another. For example,
people might feel that ANOREXIA is a stronger basis for induction than SNEEZING. From Study
4, one would expect being highly rated for Informativeness and How Much To Learn should
make a category a preferential basis for induction; also Induction, if the experiment is a valid
test of inductive preference. Furthermore, by giving participants a forced-choice test, there
would be a stronger chance of detecting any influence of the SoUnd-related dimensions on
inductive judgments.
In this study, two concepts appeared in each question. A scenario was designed in which
members of one category were found to have a certain property and members of another
category were found to have a contrary property. Presented with an individual who belonged
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to both categories, participants were asked which of the two contrary properties would transfer
to this individual.
Participants also provided confidence ratings. Previous research on metacognition has
shown that feelings of confidence are often indicative of metacognitive processes in different
kinds of judgment (Fleming & Daw, 2017; Koriat, 2011; 2015; Proust, 2012). In the present
context, we wanted to know whether inductive preference predicted by dimensions of con-
cept appraisal would be accompanied by an increase in confidence, suggesting a link between
concept appraisal and metacognition.
2.5.1. Method
2.5.1.1. Participants. Participants were 121 adults (88 females, 31 males, and 2 unspec-
ified) recruited as before (Age 18–80; MAge = 35.18). Of these, 105 were native speakers and
the remainder were fluent enough in English to take part.
2.5.1.2. Materials, design, and procedure. We used the same list of concepts as in Study
4. As described above, the materials were designed to consist of pairs of concepts that differed
strongly in the appraisal ratings given by the participants in Study 1. Without trying to dis-
confound all eight dimensions, we selected pairs that either contrasted maximally on the four
SoUnd dimensions (CAKE), while being broadly matched on the four LIDI dimensions, or
the converse. For each contrast, there were eight pairs in each of the three conceptual domains
(People, Recreations, and Health). A new set of participants were randomly assigned to one
of two groups, each group given pairs with only one type of contrast. Fig. 9 shows the mean
dimensional differences within pairs in the SoUnd contrast problems (dark bars, N = 61) and
in the LIDI contrast problems (gray bars, N = 60).
Order of concepts within pairs was counterbalanced, and each participant completed eight
induction problems in three different domains (People, Recreations, and Health) for a total
of 24 problems. Each problem stated that 80% of people in a given category (e.g., police
officers) were found to have a particular characteristic (e.g., personality type X), whereas
80% of people in another category (e.g., library users) had the opposite characteristic (e.g.,
personality type Y). Participants chose which of the two characteristics an individual who
belonged to both categories was likely to have. Participants also rated their confidence on a
scale from 0 (simply guessing) to 100 (complete confidence). The following problem is an
example of the question for People:
A psychologist studying personality has noticed that people belong to one of two differ-
ent personality types: personality type X and personality type Y. In her study, she noticed
that 80% of people who were POLICE OFFICERS had personality type X, whilst 80% of
people who were LIBRARY USERS had personality type Y. Sam is both a POLICE OFFICER
and a LIBRARY USER. Which personality type is Sam more likely to have?
In each domain, two different scenarios were used, with four problems in each scenario. All
materials can be seen in the Supplementary Materials (Appendix E). Order of domains was
randomized across participants, and order of problems within domain was constant. Upon













Contrast size on each dimension for pairs in Study 5
└──────────────LIDI─────────────┘ └─────────────SoUnd─────────────┘ 
Fig. 9. Differences on each dimension between the high and low items in each pair for SoUnd (dark bars) and
LIDI (light bars) problems. The four SoUnd dimensions are to the left, and LIDI dimensions to the right.
completion, participants were asked to describe what type of information they had used to
make their judgments. As with Study 4, participants subsequently judged relative class sizes
on a scale from 1 (more people in Category A) to 5 (more people in Category B).
Participants completed the questionnaire online through Qualtrics. Participants were told
there were no right or wrong answers.
2.5.2. Results
2.5.2.1. Exclusions. Participants who consistently chose the same category (left or right
on the page) for each question (N = 16) were excluded, leaving the final number of partici-
pants at 105: 53 for SoUnd problems and 52 for LIDI problems.13 Further, 31 participants did
not complete the class size questions and were excluded from just those analyses.
2.5.2.2. Induction responses. Fig. 10 shows the percentage of times each participant
picked the higher-rated category (the category higher on the SoUnd dimensions in SoUnd
problems and the category higher on the LIDI dimensions in LIDI problems).
The higher-rated category was chosen significantly above chance in both types of problem:
SoUnd (M = 57%, SD = 11%; t (52) = 4.59, p <.001) and LIDI (M = 66%, SD = 15%;
one-sample t (51) = 7.85, p <.001). A mixed ANOVA with domain within-subjects and prob-
lem type between-subjects showed that LIDI problems produced larger effects than SoUnd
problems (F (1,103) = 12.02, p < .001, ηp2 = .10).




























Choice of higher category in Study 5
SoUnd Contrast Pairs
LIDI Contrast Pairs
Fig. 10. Percentage choice of the category higher in SoUnd or in the LIDI dimensions in Study 5. Dotted line
shows chance level of 50%. Error bars show 95% CI.
To confirm that the effect for LIDI was not just being driven by the contrast on the Induc-
tion dimension, a partial correlation analysis across the 48 problems was run between fre-
quency of selecting the higher category and the size of the contrast between members of a
pair on each dimension, holding the contrast for Induction constant. Significant partial cor-
relations were found for Informativeness (r(45) = .332, p = .023) and How Much To Learn
(r(45) = .391, p = .007). These results confirm similar findings in Study 4, although the p
value for Informativeness here is only marginal to a Bonferroni corrected significance thresh-
old of .017.
Thus, in this forced-choice setting, in addition to the effect of the dimensions Induction,
Informativeness, and How Much To Learn seen in Study 4, we also find that people’s sense
of understanding of a concept predicts whether it is likely to be seen as a reliable basis for
making inductive choices.
2.5.2.3. Confidence judgments. Participants indicated a higher level of confidence when
they chose the higher category in the pairs contrasting in the LIDI dimensions (mean 43.8 vs.
39.2, t(50) = 3.60, p = .001, d = .22), but there was no significant difference in confidence
when they selected the higher category in SoUnd problems (mean 43.8 vs. 44.2, t(52) = –.45,
p = .66). The interaction was significant in a mixed ANOVA, F(1,102) = 9.95, p < .01, ηp2 =
.09). Thus, while there was evidence that the SoUnd appraisal of a concept predicts inductive
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choices, the collection of the other four dimensions, LIDI, had a stronger role, and was the
only factor affecting confidence.
2.5.2.4. Class size. To measure whether the category chosen as the basis for induc-
tion was influenced by class size, point biserial correlations between binary responses and
prevalence ratings across the 24 problems were computed for each individual. If a par-
ticipant was making a choice based in part on how many members they think a cate-
gory has, there should be a correlation between the inductive judgment and the class size
judgment.
For LIDI problems, there was a small positive mean correlation between the judgments
(mean = .11, SD = .22; t(27) = 2.60, p = .02). The chosen category tended to be judged as
having more members. For SoUnd problems, the mean correlation did not differ significantly
from zero (mean = .01, SD = .25; t (52) = .27, p = .79). The two means did not differ
on an independent t-test (t (27) = 1.88, p = .07). Thus, there was some weak evidence that
participants preferred the larger category.
2.5.3. Discussion
Our final study confirmed the finding of Study 4, that concepts rated highly on the dimen-
sions How Much To Learn and Inference, as well as Induction, are seen as a better basis for
inductive generalization. We also found evidence that the SoUnd factor, discovered in Studies
1 and 2, and operative in taxonomic structure in Study 3, also predicts inductive judgments
when two categories are pitted against one another. The forced choice design of this study
did not allow us to disconfound the relative importance of the eight dimensions (LIDI in one
set of problems, CAKE in the other). Study 4 did, and found no evidence for an effect of the
Deference dimension. Taken together, Studies 4 and 5 thus offer evidence that the following
forms of concept appraisal are integrated with the inductive structure of concepts: Induction,
Inference, How Much To Learn, and SoUnd.
Interestingly, participants did not feel more confident when choosing the concept higher in
SoUnd, whereas the contrast along the LIDI dimensions did produce a significant difference
in reported confidence. Finally, class size did have some small effect on inductive choice, with
the preferred category for induction tending to be judged as being the larger class (as found
by Patalano et al., 2006).
3. General discussion
Our research began with the idea that the study of concepts to date has been unneces-
sarily limited, focused overwhelmingly on the way concepts encode features or properties
of objects. We wanted to investigate concepts from a new and different perspective. In this
discussion, we start by summarizing what we take our results to show about the way con-
cept appraisal works (Section 3.1). We go on to highlight some directions for future research
(Section 3.2).
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3.1. Forms of epistemic appraisal of concepts
As the first study on the topic, our aim was to establish whether or not the putative phe-
nomenon of epistemic concept appraisal is interesting enough to merit further investigation.
We had two questions: is concept appraisal psychologically real; and is it psychologically
important? To answer the first question, we examined a number of ways that people might
plausibly assess the epistemic merits of a concept. For each, we tested whether different peo-
ple make that assessment in the same way––across a range of concepts drawn from diverse
domains. If so, that would make it plausible that certain epistemic judgments about concepts–
–dimensions of concept appraisal––are a real feature of people’s cognitive apparatus. Even
judged reliably, however, these assessments might be sui generis and irrelevant to other
cognitive functions. Our second aim was to examine their potential psychological impor-
tance by asking whether they are integrated with other central aspects of the structure of
concepts.
Philosophical considerations suggested we look for forms of epistemic appraisal in two
broad families: how much we know about a concept, and how much it enables us to know.
Our experiments were necessarily exploratory, with many open questions rather than strong
prior predictions. Nevertheless, the philosophical literature led us to expect that the factor
structure might follow the division between these two broad families, with the dimensions
Accuracy, How Much Do You Know, and Explain clustering together, as elements of individ-
ual understanding––as indeed we found. The status of Communicate was an open question,
since it could arguably fall within either family. In the event, we found Communicate to be a
consistent element of the sense of understanding factor (SoUnd). And indeed, it makes sense
that the more you know about a concept, the more ready you will be to communicate with it.
We had expected How Much To Learn, Induction, and Informativeness to cluster together,
since they are all drawn from the second broad family––how much does the concept enable
us to know? That did not turn out to be the case. People do indeed keep track of, and agree
about, ways in which a category is good or bad as a cognitive tool––how well properties
generalize to new instances, how many properties are shared by category members––but they
do so separately, rather than running together these assessments in a more general epistemic
rating, as with the sense of understanding.
We also expected that Deference might correlate negatively with the SoUnd cluster, since
the less you know, the more you might rely on others. In the event, readiness to defer to
experts was not related to how well the concept was understood. It was, however, reliably
rated between subjects, suggesting that deference is not just a context-sensitive social phe-
nomenon. When asked about different concepts, people agree that there are experts for some
categories, whereas for others, everyone is entitled to their own opinion. Deference appeared
to indicate that a term was natural-kind-like, making it behave in some respects like Induc-
tion, Informativeness, and How Much To Learn, so it may be that concept-users are inclined to
defer to experts about more inductively rich and kind-like categories, irrespective of whether
they take themselves to understand the concept well or not. We did not, however, find evi-
dence that Deference is integrated with conceptual structure (or at least, with the two aspects
probed here: taxonomic structure and induction).
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In Study 3, we saw that the other seven of our eight dimensions do predict the hierar-
chical structure of taxonomic concepts. Studies 4 and 5 turned to category-based induc-
tion. Would forms of concept appraisal predict whether a concept is seen as a dependable
basis for projecting a property observed in some members of a category to a new instance
(Millikan, 2000)? We were particularly interested in that question for the family of appraisals
that concern the epistemic utility of the category itself (LIDI). Philosophical considerations
and previous experiments (Patalano et al., 2006; Patalano et al., 2009) suggested to us that
Informativeness and How Much To Learn might predict the degree to which a concept would
be relied on for category-based induction. That the Induction dimension itself is predictive
in this respect would test the validity of that question. Furthermore, we considered that high
ratings in SoUnd might make an independent contribution to inductive preference, although
we made no strong prior prediction in this respect.
In the event, we found that Induction, Inference, and How Much To Learn all predict induc-
tive preference, as does the SoUnd factor in the forced-choice task in Study 5. This result is
further evidence that some forms of concept appraisal are integrated with key aspects of the
wider structure of concepts: the SoUnd factor (measured by the four CAKE dimensions), the
Informativeness dimension, and the How Much To Learn dimension are three independent
forms of stable concept appraisal. Studies 4 and 5 showed that these appraisals are integrated
with the aspects of conceptual structure that underpin induction––category-based induction
being one of the main things that makes a concept such a useful cognitive tool.
But what does “integrated” mean here? A concept encodes information about category
members: features used to categorize objects (small, round, hard, brown, shiny, rattles →
HAZELNUT) and further properties which those objects are expected to have (e.g., a certain
flavor). It encodes relationships between categories (WHALE → MAMMAL), in taxonomic hier-
archies and thematic groups (e.g., items on the dinner table). Many concepts are structured so
that people can reliably rate how typical an instance is; some also store individual exemplars,
or carry causal knowledge of how some properties cause or enable other properties (a mini
theory). All these kinds of information are at the “object level”: They concern the object that
falls under a concept and its properties.
Concepts are such a vital cognitive tool that we hypothesized that they would also encode
information of a rather different sort, information that is more “meta level”––about the con-
cept itself, and about its worth as a cognitive tool. That hypothesis prompted our investiga-
tion into whether epistemic appraisals form part of the structure of concepts. The hypothesis
comes in two versions. In both versions, information that is integrated in the structure of con-
cepts is responsible for people’s epistemic appraisals. In the strong version, concept appraisals
are meta-data stored with a concept: further items of information that are encoded in the struc-
ture of a concept. As well as representing properties of objects, a concept represents how good
it itself is epistemically. On this version, some representational device functions to encode
epistemic utility, a bit like the way one can use a highlighter to represent which passages in a
book are most important.
In the weaker version of the hypothesis, concept appraisals are not stored as meta-data but
generated out of stored object-level data. On this version, concept appraisals are generated
from other features of the structure of a concept rather than being encoded directly. Induction
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may be generated by checking if one has a mini theory, Informativeness by counting how
much information one could store for objects of this general kind. It is less apparent that
a unified sense of understanding could be generated in this way. But perhaps the sense of
understanding is generated from episodic memories about occasions when one has used the
concept: Did I get my facts right, did other people understand me, how well did I explain
what I meant? If so, SoUnd would not itself be a piece of information encoded with a
concept, but would somehow be a stable result of operating on information that is stored.
Our results to date do not decide between these two versions of the hypothesis. Hence, we
adopt the neutral term “integrated.” What we take our results to have shown is that forms of
concept appraisal are integrated with key aspects of the structure of a concept (taxonomic
and inductive structure), in the sense that they are either encoded by the concept directly,
or generated in a stable way out of information encoded by the concept. Our experiments
provide evidence that SoUnd, Induction, Informativeness, and How Much To Learn represent
forms of stable concept appraisal that are integrated with the wider structure of concepts.
Our experiments asked people what they think about their concepts. We could also ask
whether their assessments are accurate (cp. metacognitive accuracy). For concept appraisals
to be useful, they must track, with some fidelity, the cognitive attributes they are concerned
with. Given this important function, how can we assess the accuracy of the forms of con-
cept appraisal we have uncovered? SoUnd concerns the thinker’s evaluation of the quantity of
accurate knowledge a concept carries for them (Accuracy, How Much Do You Know, Explain,
and Communicate). This could include all the information encoded with a concept such as its
defining properties (if any) and prototypical and ideal features, together with implicit knowl-
edge and sensorimotor expectations, and explicit beliefs about the class in question. Each
piece of information may be accurately represented or it may be incorrect. That is hard to
quantify in practice, but in principle, the target of SoUnd is reasonably clear. By analogy
with perceptual decision making, we can define the sensitivity and bias of a thinker’s sense
of understanding (Fleming & Lau, 2014). SoUnd will show metacognitive sensitivity if varia-
tions in the SoUnd rating for a concept track variations in the amount (and quality) of correct
information stored with it; and it will be metacognitively unbiased (or well-calibrated) if it
allows the thinker to make an accurate estimate of how much correct information they will be
able to retrieve relying on the concept. We could define in a similar way what it would be for
the thinker to be metacognitively accurate in their appraisals of Induction, Informativeness,
and How Much To Learn.
3.2. Future directions
In this section, we identify some directions for future research. First, our methodology was
partly inspired by existing research on natural kinds and essentialism. An obvious next step
would be to ask our integration question about this aspect of the structure of concepts. Are
some forms of concept appraisal integrated with the conceptual structure that takes a cate-
gory to have an underlying essence (Newman & Knobe, 2019), causal structure (Murphy &
Medin, 1985; Rehder & Hastie, 2004), or some other kind of category coherence between
the features encoded by the concept (Patalano et al., 2006)? We can also look at coherence
S. R. Thorne et al. / Cognitive Science 45 (2021) 31 of 35
between concepts: Some concepts encode information that coheres with lots of other things
the thinker believes (Davidson, 1986; Quine, 1961). Is this reflected in Induction, Inference, or
How Much To Know? Answering these questions experimentally will give us a better appreci-
ation of how concept appraisal integrates with the wider body of knowledge and expectations
encoded in a concept.
Second, we would expect concept appraisal to be involved when people rely on concepts
when talking to others. Ratings on the Communicate dimension show considerable intersub-
jective agreement about which concepts provide a good basis for communication and which
do not (Studies 1–3). We found that this dimension clusters with Accuracy, How Much Do
You Know, and Explain into a single factor that different people rate in a similar way across a
diverse range of concepts. If we want to get an insight into why concepts come into use in our
social groups, or go out of use, the way people select which concepts to communicate with
may be the most important factor. People can signal this dimension directly in various ways,
for example, by putting scare quotes around a term, or using it with a rising, questioning into-
nation pattern. Finding that Communicate clusters as it does suggests that there are at least
three other ways, in addition to indicating directly that it is not a good basis for communi-
cation, in which we could decrease a group’s propensity to use a given concept C: by giving
feedback which shows that the information encoded by C is inaccurate, by asking questions
about C which the thinker cannot answer (eroding the How Much Do You Know rating), or
by tasking the thinker with explaining the category with the aim of dispelling the illusion
of explanatory depth (Rozenblit & Keil, 2002). Experimental work is needed to investigate
whether people’s sense of understanding a concept, hence their propensity to communicate
using it, can indeed be modulated in these ways.
These insights will be crucial if the project of conceptual engineering is to succeed (Cappe-
len, 2018; Machery, 2017; Thomasson, 2017). One way of addressing various social injustices
is by changing the way we conceive of the relevant social categories (like WOMAN or RACE).
However, to stop people using a familiar concept may take more than exhortation. We will
need to find ways to act on the psychological factors that make people select some concepts,
and leave others aside, when they engage in communication and reasoning. At the moment,
we have little idea what those factors are. They may be implicit as well as explicit. The find-
ings we report here are a first step in the direction of gaining that insight. We found that the
sense of understanding a concept, and appraisals of concepts along the Induction, Informa-
tiveness, and How Much Do You Know dimensions, affect which concepts are relied on in
two central conceptual tasks. That gives us an indication of how aspects of the structure of a
concept may affect whether or not it is selected for various uses, communication among them.
It thus points the way toward a potential place to intervene if we want people to stop using
certain commonplace but problematic concepts.
The role concept appraisal can play in conceptual engineering points toward an even
broader role. Social epistemology has highlighted how creating knowledge is a social process
achieved collectively by a group of people (Goldman, 1999). Constructing concepts looks to
be social in the same way. New concepts are introduced and tested in argument, reasoning,
and action (Dunbar, 1997). Some survive and become widely adopted, others flourish briefly
and fade, and many never get taken up at all. Concept appraisals are likely to be at work here.
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Concepts that are initially relied on tentatively will survive if they prove to be useful. Ratings
along the dimensions of Induction, Informativeness, and How Much To Learn may be part
of what convinces people that a new concept is scientifically/epistemically useful, paving the
way for its adoption. Correspondingly, a low sense of understanding for a concept which is
taken to be important on these other dimensions may motivate an individual to inquire fur-
ther into the category, learning more information, and enriching their understanding of the
concept. These suggestions are only speculative at this stage, but they do show that a deeper
understanding of concept appraisal could tell us a lot about how humans collectively develop
their conceptual schemes.
Finally, it is worth noting that the dimensions of concept appraisal we have discovered
could potentially be illuminating in a very wide range of developmental research. Develop-
mental transitions that have an obvious relevance include those in psychological essentialism
(Keil & Batterman, 1984), causal complexity (Kominsky, Zamm, & Keil, 2018), categoriza-
tion (Sloutsky, 2010), the illusion of explanatory depth (Mills & Keil, 2004), and conceptual
change (Carey, 2009). There is not space here to explore these rich connections. In a recent
review paper, two of the authors have looked at the last case in more detail (Smortchkova &
Shea, 2020).
4. Conclusion
Academics from all disciplines have strong views on the utility of many of the concepts
and theoretical terms used in their own and other fields. We debate the validity and utility of
concepts like MINDFULNESS, PERSONALITY, INTELLIGENCE, and STRESS. Many of our concerns
are broadly epistemic. We are asking how good the concepts are as a tool for scientific inquiry.
Outside of scientific concepts, people debate the content and utility of socially significant
concepts like RACE and NATIONALISM. Again, the issues are partly epistemic.
Those epistemic assessments take place reflectively and explicitly. Until now, it has been
unclear whether ordinary concept users make similar assessments of everyday concepts,
appraisals that may be less reflective and less obvious. This paper reports the first set of
experiments to examine that question. Our results indicate that the putative phenomenon of
concept appraisal is real, interesting, and merits further investigation.
Notes
1. We follow the philosophical convention of using small caps to name concepts.
2. The sample size yielded an average Standard Error for item means of 0.2 on the 1–5
scale. In simulations, this translated into a 95%CI of around 0.04 for a typical correla-
tion of 0.6 between dimensions.
3. Since participants were instructed to leave an item blank if they had no idea what the
word meant, we did not force a response to each item in Qualtrics.
4. The Kaiser–Meyer–Olin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy was 0.69, indicating
the data were suitable for this type of factor analysis (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).
Conventionally, a minimum value of 0.5–0.6 for KMO is required.
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5. An additional PCA was conducted with data transformed into z-scores within each
domain, so that correlations were not influenced by mean domain differences on dimen-
sions. The same two-component pattern was seen.
6. The four dimensions in Component 2 (LIDI) had low negative loadings on Component
1 (appearing to the left of zero on the horizontal axis), indicating a weak tendency for
higher ratings on Component 2 to be correlated with lower ratings on Component 1.
7. Such differences in Study 1 were smaller and had no notable effect on the PCA solution
(see note 5).
8. Studies 1 and 2 used 160 concepts, but 160 is not divisible by 3.
9. Our method did not test whether SoUnd is more predictive of basic level categories
than other measures (e.g., Corter & Gluck, 1992). We did not set out to test whether
SoUnd is the basis on which concepts are taxonomically organized.
10. Sample size was dictated by consideration of previously reported effect sizes.
11. For the materials selected, the four LIDI dimensions were positively correlated with
each other within each of the three concept domains.
12. Including these participants did not contribute to any differences between scenarios.
13. All analyses produced the same conclusions when all participants were included.
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